Introduction
Today"s globalized world presents "a diverse array of challenges, from a loose network of violent extremists to states that flout international norms or face internal collapse."
1 The 2010
National Security Strategy of the United States emphasizes that the September 11, 2001 attacks on America brought into "sharp focus…the dangers of violent extremism, and the simmering conflicts that followed the peaceful conclusion of the Cold War." 2 Political instability and ethnic tensions have created wide-spread pockets of state failure throughout the globe. 3 Fragile or failing states, often with repressive regimes that feel threatened, are known to precipitate deteriorating liberty and human rights, thus provoking rebel insurgencies and extremist movements.
The fragile regions of Africa are considered especially vulnerable due to "porous borders, ungoverned spaces, societal tensions & law enforcement shortcomings," and combined with a substantial Muslim population, many consider Africa vulnerable to Islamist extremism. 4 Radical
Islamist terrorists have successfully exploited vulnerabilities of weak or failing states, seizing the opportunity to aggressively and forcefully attempt to fill the resulting governance vacuum, as with the current situation in Somalia. 5 Somalia is number one on the Failed State Index, 6 it has 1 The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States, May 2010, 8. 2 Ibid., 17. 3 Examples include the unrest in Myanmar and conflicts in southern Kyrgyzstan and northwest Pakistan to name a few. Moreover, the African continent is home to twelve of the top twenty states identified by the Failed States Index to be at the greatest risk of collapse in 2010. IOL News website, "Ethnic Tensions Flare in Myanmar," 8 November 2010, http://www. Iol.co.za/news/world/ethnic-tensions-flare-in-myanmar-1.731244; and Gary Thomas, "Political Instability, Economic Woes Fuel Kyrgyz Interethnic Unrest," VOANews.com, 17 June 2010, http://www.voanews.com/english/news/PoliticalInstability-Economic-Woes-Fuel-Kyrgyz-Interethnic-Unrest-96585974.html; Foreign Policy Web site, "Is There Any Way to Fix Pakistan?" 21 October 2010, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/10/21/is_there_any_way_to_fix_pakistan? Page=0,0; and Zachary Devlin-Foltz, "Africa"s Fragile States: Empowering Extremists, Exporting Terrorism," Africa Security Brief, A Publication of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, no. 6 (August 2010): 1, http://africacenter.org/ wp-content/uploads/2010/08/AfricaBrief-6.pdf. 4 William M. Bellamy, "U.S. Security Engagement in Africa," Africa Security Brief, A Publication of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, no. 1 (June 2009): 1. 5 The United States responded to this trend in the wake of September 11 th , in part, by standing up the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in 2002 "to build partner nation capacity in order to promote regional security and stability, prevent conflict, and protect US and coalition interests." Additionally, United States Africa Command been a failed state since 1991, and al-Shabaab, the violent radical Islamist organization with close links to al Qaeda, controls most of the south and central regions of the country. 7 In this paper, I shall argue that Ethiopia is unlikely to suffer Somalia"s fate, despite the on-going insurrection in the Ogaden, due to the weakness of the insurgency. That being said, the Ethiopian situation should not be taken lightly because the state of Ethiopia is fragile and the situation is extremely complex. 8 In order for Islamist extremists to gain a strong foothold in the Ogaden, they would have to successfully integrate with an insurgency that does not share
Islamist objectives, and one that is deficient in satisfying the historically-proven prerequisites for insurgency success.
In his book, Counterinsurgency Warfare, David Galula explains that a "counterinsurgent"s chances of victory will depend on whether certain preliminary conditions are met…the prerequisites for a successful insurgency." 9 He concludes that a successful insurgency depends on a cause, the weakness of the counterinsurgent, geographic conditions, and outside support, the former two being absolutes. 10 This paper utilizes Galula"s framework of prerequisites for a successful insurgency to prove the hypothesis that southern Ethiopia is not likely to fall victim to a prevailing Islamic extremist influence due to the nature of the ongoing insurrection in Ogaden.
History
In order to understand the nature of the insurgency in Ethiopia"s Somali region, it is important to reflect on historical background and some primary catalysts which emphasize the fact that this conflict "takes place within a dynamic regional context. 
Necessity of a Cause
Given the historical context of the Ogaden region, coupled with the Ethiopian government"s actions, insurrection in the region is not surprising. Galula makes clear that a cause that can "pry the population away from the counterinsurgent, control it, and mobilize it," is 33 Peter J. Pham Congressional Testimony, "Regional Dimensions, " 8. 34 This EPRDF crackdown in Ethiopia included suspending Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) and non-governmental organization (NGO) operations in Ogaden, and further inflamed tensions with the ONLF and Islamist extremists (al Shabaab) 39 Kevin Kenney, Interview. 40 Under the current regime, the government constitution pronounces a commitment to liberal democracy, respect for political freedoms and human rights, but the EPRDF has not accepted that "the opposition is qualified to take power via the ballot box and [the EPRDF regards] the expression of differing views and interests as a form of betrayal," and are therefore repressed. International Crisis Group, "Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and its Discontents," Executive Summary.
necessary for long-term ascendancy.
41 Moreover, the cause should be rooted in clear and understood strategic criteria that can be tactically manipulated in order for the insurgent to appeal to the whole and generate success.
42

Strategic Criteria of the Cause
A viable insurgent cause must meet strategic criteria within Galula"s framework; "the insurgent must identify himself totally with it," it must "attract the largest number of supporters and repel the minimum of opponents," and it must be enduring. 43 The struggle of the Somalis of the Ethiopian Ogaden has been rooted in the fight "for self-determination for the people of Meeting, 29 April 2004, 29-30 . The United Nations (UN) recognizes three avenues for the attainment of self-determination through General Assembly Resolution 1541: emergence as a sovereign independent state, free association with an independent state, or integration with an independent state. Based on UN definitions, integration with an independent state would most closely describe a relationship under a constitution-based federal republic with a strong democratic tradition, such as the United States. Free association with an independent state essentially describes a democratic relationship similar to the one that Ethiopia"s ethnic federalism was originally intended to be, with a "constitution that vests all powers not attributed to the federal government in the regional states." International Crisis Group, "Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and its Discontents," Executive Summary; and Sadiq A. Abdirahman, "The Ogaden: People"s Right to Self-Determination," Mashri Quarterly, 59 Terrance Lyons, "Avoiding Conflict in the Horn of Africa," 13. The drive for self-determination and resistance to Ethiopia has existed for more than a century and has been amplified by repression. The violent repression significantly increased only after the 2005 parliamentary election when "the EPRDF effectively criminalized dissent and sent an unmistakable message that effective opposition would not be tolerated." (Ibid., 14 
Weakness of the Counterinsurgent
The ONLF"s strength to overcome its challenges, to live and continue to grow, is equally dependent on the EPRDF regime"s vulnerability, because the weakness of the counter-insurgent is vital for insurgency success. 81 Galula"s framework includes five guidelines for measuring the strengths and weaknesses of a political regime; absence of problems, national consensus, resoluteness of the counterinsurgent leadership, the leader"s knowledge of counterinsurgency warfare, and the machine for control of the population. 89 The Ogaden Basin is "the largest proven hydrocarbon bearing sedimentary basin in Ethiopia," with two large gas discoveries. Additionally, the Chinese oil company that was attacked by the ONLF in 2007 was conducting extensive oil exploration in the Ogaden. Southwest Energy Web site, "Energy for Africa, Ogaden Basin," http://www.sw-oilgas.com/ogaden_basin_overview.htm; and Jonathan Holslag, "China"s New Security Strategy for Africa," Parameters 39, no. 2 (July 2009): 24, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/Articles/09summer/holslag.pdf. divergence within Ethiopian society, and its extreme poverty is further aggravated by severe under-development, a harsh climate, lack of infrastructure, and chronic instability.
90
The EPRDF has responded to chronic unrest with repression, in addition to restricting the conduct of humanitarian operations in the region by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), CJTF-HOA, and other international agencies. 91 One third of Ethiopia"s land mass is plagued by a humanitarian crisis which poses significant challenges for economic development under current conditions. 92 Although Ethiopia remains one of the world"s poorest countries, 93 it is one of a few African countries that achieved a relatively high GDP growth rate since 1991 94 and has moved forward more than the two previous regimes, and maintained a military strong enough to keep the insurgency from threatening the state.
95
National Consensus
Galula says that the solidity of a regime is primarily based on national consensus. 
Resoluteness of the Counterinsurgent Leadership
An examination of the Ethiopian Prime Minister"s relentless tenacity gives credence to Galula"s assertion that the role and resoluteness of leadership is paramount in determining the strength and/or weakness of the counterinsurgent, 104 especially when leading a country plagued by problems and devoid of a genuine national consensus. Meles Zenawi"s "rise to power was methodical and crafty [and] he is exceptionally skilled at mobilizing his supporters and isolating his enemies." 105 Additionally, during his tenure as Prime Minister, he systematically quelled opposition in "strong reassertion of state authority." 106 Therefore, in the case of Ethiopia, the resoluteness of the counterinsurgent leadership is arguably one of its greatest strengths.
Counterinsurgent Leader's Knowledge of Counterinsurgency Warfare
In addition to his resoluteness, as a veteran insurgent, Meles and his regime are keenly "aware of the strategy and tactics required in fighting an insurgency" that Galula finds essential for successful counterinsurgent leaders. 107 The EPRDF regime was born out of a victorious insurgency, largely comprised of former Tigray People"s Liberation Front (TPFL) members that
Meles led as chairman of the TPLF beginning in 1983. 108 The TPLF effectively fought using guerrilla warfare tactics 109 for more than a decade.
The Machine for the Control of the Population
The resolute and seasoned counterinsurgent leader who rules a country with widespread and deep-seated problems and tenuous national cohesion, must have a machine to control the population in order to quell an insurgency. Galaula describes this machine as consisting of four essential instruments of control: "the political structure, the administrative bureaucracy, the police, and the armed forces." 110 The Ethiopian government "enjoys military, economic and political superiority over the ONLF," 111 demonstrating Meles" firm command of his "machine."
This example underscores Galula"s claim that keeping a population under a system of terror and mutual suspicion, where political opposition is not tolerated, 112 favors the counterinsurgent. For example, despite the EPRDF"s democratic rhetoric, 113 there is evidence that the regime reinforces a climate of fear by manipulating international aid as "political weapons to control the population, punish dissent, and undermine political opponents," 114 rendering citizens "unable to speak freely, organize political activities, or challenge government policies without fear of reprisal." 115 The political and bureaucratic instruments are only as effective as the reinforcing function of the EPRDF"s police and armed forces. The 200,000 person all-volunteer ENDF is one of the largest militaries in Africa, 116 and, combined with the regime"s economic and political superiority, remains the strength of the counterinsurgency campaign that is sustained through brute force.
117
Geographic Conditions
Galula explains that geography can play an important role in a successful insurgency if the geographic factors, such as location, size, terrain, climate, population, economy, configuration, and international borders create beneficial effects for the insurgent. 118 He says the insurgent"s ideal situation "would be a large land-locked country…with jungle-covered mountains along the borders and scattered swamps in the plains, in a temperate zone with a large and dispersed rural population and a primitive economy." 119 Although Ethiopia is land-locked and the latter two conditions exist in the Ogaden, in the struggle between the ENDF and the ONLF, collective geographic conditions largely favor the counterinsurgent. 118 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, [23] [24] . 119 Ibid., 25.
Location, Size, Terrain, Population, and Climate
The Ogaden region, residing in the southeastern lowlands, is slightly smaller than the state of Texas, covering approximately 270,000 square miles. 120 The high temperatures and low rainfall year round, 121 with access to safe drinking water for only 38% of its population of nearly four and a half million, 122 makes for a challenging environment for survival, let alone sustaining an insurgency. Moreover, a worsening drought, rising food prices, government restrictions on movement and commercial trade, as well as minimal access to independent relief organizations, leaves the region highly vulnerable to humanitarian disaster. 123 Despite the harsh climate, which
Galula says is in favor of the counterinsurgent, 124 and the large size of the region, the ENDF has been able to successfully contain the Ogaden population, as well as successfully restrict international access (see Figure 6 ).
Configuration and International Borders
According to Galula, "a country that is easy to compartmentalize hinders the insurgent," 125 as is the case in Ethiopia. International borders, on the other hand, can be problematic for a counterinsurgent if the neighboring countries are sympathetic to the insurgents. 126 The Ogaden region is surrounded by "Djibouti to the north, Kenya to the south west, Somalia to the east and south," 127 and Somaliland to the north 128 (see Figure 7) . 
Outside Support
The final prerequisite for a successful insurgency within Galula"s framework is outside If any extremist organization was to gain a significant foothold in Ogaden, one might assume that it would be al-Shabaab due to its significant control of large portions of Somalia and its mutual statements of support to al-Qaeda. 156 However, al-Shabaab also suffers from its own vulnerabilities. First of all, the organization faces multiple internal divisions, 157 including within the leadership. 158 Second, the leadership structure is strongly influenced by foreigners who represent more than 50 percent of the 85 member council of al-Shabaab, 159 and who do not often gain approval from the populace. 160 Finally, al-Shabaab may further alienate large numbers of Somalis due to its brutal and oppressive tactics against the population, 161 reinforcing a majority"s hatred of extremism and foreign jihadists.
162
Political Support
Aside from direct and indirect support to the insurgent, Galula says that political support often comes in the form of "pressure applied directly on the counterinsurgent, or indirectly by diplomatic action in the international forum," 163 including such avenues as a diaspora lobby and media engagement. 164 The ONLF is having "great battlefield success" over the internet. 165 The internet is widely utilized by Ethiopian Diaspora, Somali irredentists, and the ONLF in an attempt to "sway public opinion, or to reinforce existing public sympathy." 166 It may seem reasonable to dismiss the numerous ONLF websites and blogs consisting of strident opinions and solicitations, as rhetoric and propaganda, but many of the claims have been substantiated by Human Rights Watch (HRW) Reports.
For more than three years, HRW Reports have documented abuses by Ethiopian troops and by ONLF rebels in Ogaden. 167 The Ethiopian diaspora "has been very effective in raising money and using the internet to organize demonstrations and lobby members of the U.S.
Congress, State Department, and World Bank," and the most influential voices of this large and diverse community are harshly critical of the EPRDF. 168 The ONLF could benefit from international community pressure on the EPRDF regime in the form of public criticism or donor reductions and/or restrictions. However, as of a June 2008 HRW report, and despite diaspora influence, the US government and other donor governments with leverage have refrained from "even mild public concern, much less criticism." 169 Despite external criticisms from the diaspora and other agencies, absence of accountability for the EPRDF regime provides no incentive to change its behavior.
Conclusion
The current state of affairs in Ethiopia, occurring within a dynamic regional context, 170 has generated legitimate concern about the insurrection in the Ogaden providing an opening for This analysis only provides a brief glimpse at the challenges and deep-rooted history of instability and repression of Ethiopia"s Ogaden region. Additionally, the problems with Ethiopia and the Ogaden are intertwined in a broad regional context. Although it is unlikely that the current insurrection in Ogaden will create an opening for a significant Islamist extremists influence, there are implications for United States national security in the Horn of Africa and some recommendations are provided for consideration (see Appendix A). 176 Every major attack that the ONLF has carried out, the EPRDF regime met with a sharp response while consistently striking down opposition. 177 The two most recent circumstances where Islamist extremists have gained a significant organized presence in an area include taking advantage of the governance vacuum created in the wake of a failed state like Somalia, or by joining ranks with insurgent forces against an existing state as in Afghanistan. David Shinn, "Al-Shabaab Tries to Take Control in Somalia."
178 Zachary Devlin-Foltz, "Africa"s Fragile States," 5-7. 179 Furthermore, Ethiopian intervention has proven effective in disrupting al-Qaeda"s effort to establish a base of operations in Somalia, making it improbable that Islamist extremists could gain an influential foothold on Ethiopian soil with the current EPRDF regime firmly in place. Peter J. Pham, "Regional Dimensions, " 6. 4. Significant divisions exist within the ONLF leadership, amongst the Ethiopian Somali people of Ogaden, within al-Shabaab, and amongst the Somali diaspora. 187 5. The atmosphere just prior to and during the 2005 election demonstrates the political nature of the insurgency. 188 6. There is some evidence of desires for peace on both sides but extensive skepticism about its veracity. 189 7. There is a humanitarian crisis in the Ogaden largely contributed to the EPRDF regime.
190
8. The US is "contributing to the oppression of Ethiopia"s vulnerable populations."
191 Recommendations 1. Tie economic aid to benchmark accomplishments. US aid to Ethiopia should be "conditional upon access to the Ogaden," 192 and tied to specific items with associated milestone requirements that must be met in order to receive future funds. The US and other international donors to Ethiopia must push for ERPDF regime accountability with respect to human rights abuses, humanitarian crisis, and free and fair elections, especially in light of recent opposition to authoritarian regimes such as Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Sudan, and Yemen. The US needs Ethiopian support in pursuit of Islamist extremist networks, but Ethiopia also needs US support for the same because al-Shabaab is just across the border. It is in our interest to pursue counterterrorism policies, but this pursuit must be in conjunction with the "promotion of a longterm political stability-which is the only way terrorist threats will ultimately subside." 193 Somaliland has chosen political independence and democratic progress and US recognition through economic, political and security cooperation 196 can secure them as a partner in international anti-terrorism efforts and serve as a model of democratic progress to other struggling African nations.
Figure 2
Ethiopia at the Turn of the 20th Century
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The circles highlight a rough depiction of historical ethnic divisions in Ethiopia. The northcentral region encompassing the capital, Addis Ababa, was predominantly Amharan and was the dominant ruling ethnic group from 1880-1991. 199 The Tigrayans, making up the majority of the EPRDF, have been the governing ethnic group since 1991. This map provides a good illustration of isolation of the Ogaden region.
